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Abstract
We study a steady state of a free entry oligopoly with differentiated goods, that is,
a monopolistic competition, with sluggish adjustment of entry and exit of firms under
general demand and cost functions by a differential game approach. Mainly we show
that the number of firms at the steady state in the open-loop solution of monopolistic
competition is smaller than that at the static equilibrium of monopolistic competition, and
that the number of firms at the steady state of the memoryless closed-loop monopolistic
competition is larger than that at the steady state of the open-loopmonopolistic competition,
and may be larger than the number of firms at the static equilibrium.
Keywords: monopolistic competition; differential game; general demand function; general
cost function; open-loop; closed-loop
1 Introduction
There aremany studies of an oligopoly by differential game theory, for example, Cellini and Lambertini
(2003a), Cellini and Lambertini (2003b), Cellini and Lambertini (2004), Cellini and Lambertini
(2005), Cellini and Lambertini (2007), Cellini and Lambertini (2011), Fujiwara (2006), Fujiwara
(2008) and Lambertini (2018). Most of these studies used a model of specific (linear or ex-
ponential) demand functions and specific (quadratic or linear) cost functions. We study a
steady state of a dynamic free entry oligopoly with differentiated goods, that is, a monopolistic
competition with sluggish adjustment of entry and exit of firms under general demand and
cost functions by a differential game approach. In the next section we present a model and
assumptions. We consider a dynamics of the number of firms which enter into the industry
according to the rule that the number of firms increases or decreases proportionally to the total
1
profits of the firms1. In Section 3 we consider an open-loop solution of a differential game
analysis of monopolistic competition. We present both a general analysis and a linear example.
In Section 4 we examine a general model of a memoryless closed-loop solution. In Section 5
we consider an example with linear demand and cost functions of the memoryless closed-loop
solution. We compare open-loop and memoryless closed-loop solutions, and mainly show the
following results.
1. The number of firms at the steady state in the open-loop solution of monopolistic
competition is smaller than that at the static equilibrium of monopolistic competition.
2. The number of firms at the steady state in the memoryless closed-loop solution of
monopolistic competition is larger than that at the steady state of the open-loop solution
of monopolistic competition, and may be larger than the number of firms at the static
equilibrium.
We also show that when the discount rate (denoted by ρ) approaches to positive infinity, or
the speed of adjustment of the number of firms approaches to zero, the steady states of the
open-loop and the closed-loop solutions approach to the static equilibrium of monopolistic
competition.
2 The model and free entry condition
There is a symmetric oligopoly where, at any t ∈ [0,∞), n firms, Firms 1, 2, . . . , n produce
differentiated goods. The firms maximize their discounted profits. Let xi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
be the outputs of the firms, pi(t) be the price of the good of Firm i at t.
The inverse demand function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
pi(t) = pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For simplicity we denote pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)),
∂pi(x1(t),x2(t),...,xn(t))
∂xi(t)
,
∂pi(x1(t),x2(t),...,xn(t))
∂xj(t)
,
∂2pi(x1(t),x2(t),...,xn(t))
∂xi(t)2
,
∂2pi(x1(t),x2(t),...,xn(t))
∂xi(t)∂xj (t)
, j , i, by pi,
∂pi
∂xi(t)
,
∂pi
∂xj(t)
,
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
,
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂xj (t)
, and so on.
We assume
∂pi
∂xi(t)
< 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
∂pi
∂x j(t)
< 0, j , i, ∂pi∂x j (t)
 <  ∂pi∂xi(t)
 ,
and
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j (t)
xi(t) < 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i. (1)
1Alternatively, we can assume that the number of firms increases or decreases proportionally to the average
profit of the firms. Essentially the same result is obtained in both cases.
2
The last condition means that the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes. Note that
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
xi(t) =
∂2pi xi(t)
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
.
Similarly,
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂x j(t)∂xk(t)
xk(t) =
∂2pixk (t)
∂x j (t)∂xk(t)
, j , i, k , i, j .
We assume  ∂2pi xi(t)∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
 ≥  ∂2pi xk(t)∂x j(t)∂xk (t)
 .
Then, we obtain
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+
∂2pi
∂x j (t)∂xk(t)
xk (t) < 0, j , i, k , i, j . (2)
and  ∂pi∂x j(t) + ∂2pi∂xi(t)∂x j(t) xi(t)
 ≥  ∂pi∂x j(t) + ∂2pi∂x j (t)∂xk(t) xk(t)
 . (3)
By symmetry of the model at the steady states of open-loop and closed-loop solutions xi(t) =
x j(t) = xk(t).
About the derivative of pi with respect to n we have
∂pi
∂n(t)
=
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x j(t).
The cost function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
c(xi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
All firms have the same cost functions. It satisfies c′(xi(t)) > 0. The instantaneous profit of
Firm i, is
pii(t) = xi(t)pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) − c(xi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The moving of the number of firms is governed by
dn(t)
dt
= s
[
n∑
i=1
xi(t)pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) −
n∑
i=1
c(xi(t))
]
, s > 0. (4)
The number of firms increases or decreases proportionally to the total profit of the firms.
The problem of Firm i is
max
xi(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[xi(t)pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) − c(xi(t))]dt,
subject to (4). ρ > 0 is the discount rate.
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The present value Hamiltonian function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hi(t) =e
−ρt {xi(t)p(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) − c(xi(t))
+λi(t)s

n∑
j=1
x j(t)p j(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) −
n∑
j=1
c(x j (t))

 .
The current value Hamiltonian function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hˆi(t) =e
ρtH1(t) = xi(t)pi(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) − c(xi(t))
+ λi(t)s

n∑
j=1
x j (t)p j(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) −
n∑
j=1
c(x j (t))
 .
Let
µi(t) = e
−ρtλi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
µi(t) is the costate variable.
Assume that the outputs of all firms are equal. The free entry condition is
pi(x, x, . . . , x)x − c(x) − f = 0.
From this
dn
dx
= −
pi(x, x, . . . , x) +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
x − c′(x)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
x2
.
Suppose that a monopolistic firm produce n substitutable goods. It determines the output of
each good. By symmetry we assume that the outputs of all goods are equal. Let x be the output
of each good. Its profit is npi(x, x, . . . , x)x − nc(x). The condition for profit maximization at t
in the static equilibrium is
n
[
pi(x, x, . . . , x) +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x − c′(x)
]
= 0.
If
pi(x, x, . . . , x) +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x − c′(x) ≥ 0,
the output of each firm in the steady states of open-loop and closed-loop solutions should be
smaller than (or equal to) the output of each good by the above monopolist. Therefore, we
assume
pi(x, x, . . . , x) +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x − c′(x) < 0.
Then,
dn
dx
< 0. (5)
This holds in all cases.
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We can assume
pi − c
′(xi(t)) > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
This means that the price of the good is larger than the marginal cost of the firms.
Consider a case such that each firm determines its output given the prices of the goods of
other firms. Then, the profit maximization condition for Firm i in the static oligopoly is
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
xi(t) +
∑
j,i
∂pi
∂x j (t)
xi(t)
dx j(t)
dxi(t)
− c′(xi(t)) = 0. (6)
From the condition that p j(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is constant for each j , i, we have
∂p j
∂x j (t)
dx j(t)
dxi(t)
+
∑
k,i, j
∂p j
∂xk (t)
dxk(t)
dxi(t)
+
∂p j
∂xi(t)
= 0.
By symmetry
∂p j
∂xk(t)
=
∂p j
∂xi(t)
and
dxk (t)
dxi (t)
=
dxj (t)
dxi(t)
. Then,
dx j(t)
dxi(t)
= −
∂p j
∂xi(t)
∂p j
∂xj(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂p j
∂xi(t)
.
Again by symmetry
∂p j
∂xj (t)
=
∂pi
∂xi(t)
,
∂p j
∂xi(t)
=
∂pi
∂xj (t)
at the equilibrium. Thus, (6) is rewritten as
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
)2
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xi(t)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
− (n − 1)
(
∂pi
∂xj(t)
)2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t))
=pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj(t)
) [
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
]
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) = 0.
Since
∂pi
∂xi(t)
< 0,
∂pi
∂xj(t)
< 0 and
 ∂pi∂xi(t)  >  ∂pi∂xj (t) , we have
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂x j(t)
< 0,
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
> 1. (7)
If
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj (t)
) [
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
]
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) ≤ 0,
at the steady state of open-loop and closed-loop solutions, the output of each firm is larger than
(or equal to) that under the above Bertrand type behaviors of firms. Thus, we assume
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj(t)
) [
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
]
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n − 2)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) > 0,
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at the steady states of open-loop and closed-loop solutions of dynamic oligopoly. From (7) we
can assume
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂x j (t)
)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) > 0. (8)
3 The open-loop solution
3.1 General analysis
We seek to the general open-loop solution. The first order condition for Firm i is
∂Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)
=pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) (9)
+ λi(t)s
[
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂p j
∂xi(t)
x j(t)
]
= 0.
The second order condition is
∂2Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)2
=2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
− c′′(xi(t)) (10)
+ λi(t)s
[
2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
xi(t) − c
′′(xi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂2p j
∂xi(t)2
x j(t)
]
< 0.
The adjoint condition is
−
∂Hˆi(t)
∂n(t)
= −
∂pi
∂x j (t)
xi(t)x j(t) (11)
− λi(t)s
[
∂p j
∂xk(t)
xk(t)
n∑
l=1
xl(t) + x j(t)p j − c(x j (t)))
]
=
∂λi(t)
∂t
− ρλi(t), j , i, k , j .
At the steady state we have xi(t)p
(∑n
j=1 x j (t)
)
− c(xi(t)) = 0 and
∂λi(t)
∂t
= 0 for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. By symmetry, all xi(t)’s and all λi(t)’s are equal, and
∂pi
∂x j (t)
=
∂p j
∂xi(t)
=
∂p j
∂xk(t)
, j , i, k , j,
∂2p j
∂xi(t)2
=
∂2pi
∂x j(t)2
, j , i.
Denote the steady state values of xi(t), λi(t) and n(t) by x
∗, λ∗ and n∗. (9), (10) and (11) are
reduced to
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗ − c′(x∗) + λ∗s
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+ (n∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x∗ − c′(x∗)
)
= 0, (12)
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2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
x∗ − c′′(x∗) + λ∗s
(
2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
+ (n∗ − 1)
∂2pi
∂x j (t)2
x∗ − c′′(x∗)
)
< 0,
and
−
∂pi
∂x j(t)
(x∗)2 − λ∗n∗s
∂pi
∂x j (t)
(x∗)2 = −ρλ∗.
Therefore,
λ∗s =
s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
(x∗)2
ρ − n∗s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
(x∗)2
< 0. (13)
From (12) and (13)
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗ − c′(x∗) (14)
+
s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
(x∗)2
ρ − n∗s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
(x∗)2
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗ + (n∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x∗ − c′(x∗)
)
= 0.
Let x˜ and n˜ be the equilibrium output of each firm and the number of firms in the static
monopolistic competition. Then,
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x˜ − c′(x˜) = 0.
Suppose that x = x˜ for each firm and n = n˜. The left-hand side of (14) is
(n − 1)
s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
x2
ρ − ns
∂pi
∂xj(t)
x2
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x.
This is positive. Thus, under the assumption that the second order condition is satisfied, the
output of each firm in the open-loop solution is larger than that at the static equilibrium, that
is, x∗ > x˜.
From (5) n∗ < n˜. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. The number of firms at the steady state in the open-loop solution of monopolistic
competition is smaller than that at the static equilibrium of monopolistic competition.
Note that when ρ → +∞ or s → 0, the steady state of open-loop solution approaches to the
static equilibrium..
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3.2 A linear example
Suppose that the inverse demand function for Firm i is
pi(t) = a − xi(t) − b
n∑
j,i
x j (t).
a is a positive constant, and 0 < b < 1. Also suppose that the cost function of Firm
i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
c(xi(t)) = cxi(t) + f , c > 0.
f > 0 is the fixed cost. The moving of the number of firms is governed by
dn(t)
dt
= s
[(
a − xi(t) − b
n∑
j,i
x j(t)
)
n∑
i=1
xi(t) − c
n∑
i=1
xi(t) − n(t) f
]
, s > 0.
The current value Hamiltonian function is
Hˆi(t) =xi(t)
(
a − xi(t) − b
n∑
j,i
x j(t)
)
− cxi(t) − f
+ λi(t)s
©­«a − x j(t) − b
n∑
k, j
xk (t)
ª®¬
n∑
j=1
x j(t) − c
n∑
j=1
x j(t) − n(t) f
 .
The first order and the second order conditions for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are
∂Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)
= (1 + λi(t)s)
(
a − 2xi(t) − b
n∑
i,i
x j (t) − c
)
− λi(t)sb
∑
j,i
x j(t) = 0,
and
∂2Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)2
= −2 (1 + λi(t)s) < 0.
The adjoint condition for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
−
∂Hˆi(t)
∂n(t)
=bxi(t)x j(t) − λi(t)s
©­«a − x j(t) − b
∑
k, j
xk (t)
ª®¬ x j (t).
−cx j (t) − f − bxk (t)
n∑
l=1
xl(t)
]
=
∂λi(t)
∂t
− ρλi(t).
At the steady state we have (a −
∑n
j=1 x j(t))xi(t) − cxi(t) − f = 0 and
∂λi(t)
∂t
= 0 for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. By symmetry, all xi(t)’s and all λi(t)’s are equal. Denote the steady state
values of xi(t), λi(t) and n(t) by x
∗, λ∗ and n∗. Then, the above adjoint condition is reduced to
b(x∗)2 + λ∗n∗sb(x∗)2 = −ρλ∗.
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Figure 1: The numbers of firms in open-loop and ρ
From this
λ∗ = −
b(x∗)2
ρ + n∗sb(x∗)2
< 0,
or
λ∗s = −
bs(x∗)2
ρ + n∗sb(x∗)2
< 0.
Since ρ > 0, when s → 0 we have λ∗s → 0. Similarly, when ρ → +∞ we have λ∗s → 0.
At the steady state the first order condition is reduced to
(1 + λ∗s) (a − 2x∗ − (n∗ − 1)bx∗ − c) − λ∗s(n∗ − 1)bx∗ (15)
= (a − 2x∗ − (n∗ − 1)bx∗ − c) −
b2s(x∗)2
ρ + n∗bs(x∗)2
(a − 2∗x∗ − 2(n∗ − 1)bx∗ − c) = 0.
On the other hand, the free entry condition at the steady state is
(a − x∗ − (n∗ − 1)bx∗)x∗ − c(x∗) − f = 0. (16)
Solving (15) and (16) we get the steady state values of x∗ and n∗. We give graphical represen-
tations in Figure 1 assuming a = 11, f = 4, c = 1, s = 1
10
, b = 4
5
and in Figure 2 assuming
a = 11, f = 4, c = 1, ρ = 1
2
, b = 4
5
.
When s → 0 or ρ → +∞, (15) is further reduced to
a − 2x∗ − (n∗ − 1)bx∗ − c = 0.
This is equivalent to the static equilibrium condition.
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Figure 2: The numbers of firms in open-loop and s
4 The memoryless closed-loop solution: A general analysis
We seek to a memoryless closed-loop solution. The first order condition and the second order
condition are the same as those in the open-loop solution as follows.
∂Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)
=pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) (17)
+ λi(t)s
[
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
xi(t) − c
′(xi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂p j
∂xi(t)
x j(t)
]
= 0,
and
∂2Hˆi(t)
∂xi(t)2
=2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
− c′′(xi(t))
+ λi(t)s
[
2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
xi(t) − c
′′(xi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂2p j
∂xi(t)2
x j(t)
]
< 0.
The adjoint condition is different from that in the open-loop solution. It is written as
−
∂Hˆi(t)
∂n(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi(t)
∂x j (t)
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
=
∂λi(t)
∂t
− ρλi(t). (18)
The term in (18)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi(t)
∂x j(t)
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
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takes into account the interaction between the control variable of the firms other than Firm i
and the current level of the state variable. We have∑
j,i
∂Hˆi(t)
∂x j (t)
=(n − 1)xi(t)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+ λi(t)s
∑
j,i
p j +
∂p j
∂x j (t)
x j(t) +
n∑
k, j
∂pk
∂x j(t)
xk(t) − c
′(x j(t))
 , j , i, k , j .
From (17)
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
= −
1
∆
{
(1 + λi(t)s)
(
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
xi(t)
)
x j (t) (19)
+λi(t)s
(
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x j(t) +
∑
j,i
∂p j
∂xi(t)∂xk (t)
x j(t)xk(t)
)}
, j , i, k , i, j,
where
∆ =2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
− c′′(xi(t)) (20)
+ λi(t)s
[
2
∂pi
∂xi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)2
xi(t) − c
′′(xi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂2p j
∂xi(t)2
x j(t)
]
< 0.
At the steady state we have p
(∑n
k=1 xk (t)
)
xi(t) − c(xi(t)) = 0 and
∂λi(t)
∂t
= 0 for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. By symmetry, all xi(t)’s and all λi(t)’s are equal. Denote the steady state values
of xi(t), λi(t) and n(t) by x
∗∗, λ∗∗ and n∗∗. Then, using
∂p j
∂xi(t)
=
∂pi
∂xj (t)
, (17) and (18) are reduced
to
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) (21)
+ λ∗∗s
[
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
= 0,
and
−
∂pi
∂x j (t)
(x∗∗)2 − λ∗∗n∗∗s
∂pi
∂x j(t)
(x∗∗)2 −
[
(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x∗∗ (22)
+λ∗∗s(n∗∗ − 1)
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
)]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
= − ρλ∗∗.
From (21)
λ∗∗s = −
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
, (23)
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and
1 + λ∗∗s =
(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
x∗∗
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂xj(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
. (24)
Then, (22) is rewritten as
−
∂pi
∂x j(t)
(x∗∗)2 − λ∗∗n∗∗s
∂pi
∂x j (t)
(x∗∗)2
+ (n∗∗ − 1)
[
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂x j(t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
= −ρλ∗∗.
This means
λ∗∗s =
∂pi
∂xj(t)
s(x∗∗)2 − (n∗∗ − 1)s
[
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj(t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
ρ − n∗∗s
∂pi
∂xj(t)
(x∗∗)2
. (25)
By (8),
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂x j (t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) > 0.
From (25) and (21) we get
∂Hˆi
∂xi(t)
= pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) (26)
+
∂pi
∂xj (t)
s(x∗∗)2 − (n∗∗ − 1)s
[
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj(t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
ρ − n∗∗s
∂pi
∂xj (t)
(x∗∗)2
[
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗
+(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
= 0.
Compare (26) and (14). Suppose that x = x∗∗, n = n∗∗ and (26) is satisfied, the left-hand side
of (14) is
(n∗∗ − 1)s
[
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj (t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
ρ − n∗∗s
∂pi
∂xj(t)
(x∗∗)2
[
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ (27)
+(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
.
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At the steady state from (19)
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
=
1
Γ
{
−(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j(t)
x∗∗
(
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
x∗∗
)
x∗∗ (28)
+
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
) [
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+ (n∗∗ − 1)
∂2pi
∂x j (t)∂xk(t)
x∗∗
]
x∗∗
}
,
=
1
Γ
{
(n∗∗ − 1)(pi − c
′(x∗∗))
(
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂x j (t)∂xk(t)
x∗∗
)
x∗∗
−(n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
[(
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
x∗∗
)
−
(
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
x∗∗
)]
x∗∗
−(n∗∗ − 2)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
)
x∗∗
}
,
where
Γ = ∆
(
pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂x j (t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
)
.
We have ∆ < 0, pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) < 0, pi − c
′(x∗∗) > 0, and from (1),
(2) and (3),
∂pi
∂x j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂xi(t)∂x j(t)
xi(t) < 0,
∂pi
∂x j (t)
+
∂2pi
∂x j (t)∂xk(t)
xi(t) < 0,
and  ∂pi∂x j (t) + ∂2pi∂xi(t)∂x j(t) xi(t)
 ≥  ∂pi∂x j(t) + ∂2pi∂x j (t)∂xk(t) xi(t)
 .
Suppose
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
≥ 0. From (25), λ∗s ≤ 0. By (21), we have pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) ≤ 0. From
(28) this means
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
< 0. It is a contradiction. Thus, we have
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
< 0, and then (27) is
positive (because pi +
∂pi
∂xi(t)
x∗∗ + (n∗∗ − 1)
∂pi
∂xj (t)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗) < 0). This means x∗∗ < x∗ and
n∗∗ > n∗. We have shown the following result.
Proposition 2. The number of firms at the steady state in the memoryless closed-loop solution
of monopolistic competition is larger than that in the open-loop solution of monopolistic
competition.
If
∂pi
∂xj (t)
s(x∗∗)2 − (n∗∗ − 1)s
[
pi +
(
∂pi
∂xi(t)
−
∂pi
∂xj (t)
)
x∗∗ − c′(x∗∗)
]
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
> 0 in (26), x∗∗ < x˜
and the number of firms at the steady state in the closed-loop solution is larger than that at the
static equilibrium of free entry oligopoly.
Also note that from (26) we find that when s → 0 or ρ → +∞, the steady state of the
closed-loop solution approaches to the static equilibrium.
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Figure 3: The numbers of firms in open-loop, closed-loop and ρ
5 The memoryless closed-loop solution: A linear example
Similarly to the example in the open-loop case, we assume that the inverse demand function is
pi(t) = a − xi(t) − b
n∑
j,i
x j(t), a > 0,
and the cost function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
c(xi(t)) = cxi(t) + f , c > 0, f > 0.
The moving of the number of firms is governed by
dn(t)
dt
= s
[(
a − xi(t) − b
n∑
j,i
x j(t)
)
n∑
i=1
xi(t) − c
n∑
i=1
xi(t) − n(t) f
]
, s > 0.
From (23), (24) and (20), at the steady state we have
λ∗∗s = −
a − 2x∗∗ − (n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c
a − 2x∗∗ − 2(n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c
,
1 + λ∗∗s = −
(n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗
a − 2x∗∗ − 2(n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c
,
∆ =
2(n∗∗ − 1)x∗∗
a − 2x∗∗ − 2(n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c
,
and
∆[a − 2x∗∗ − 2(n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c)] = 2(n∗∗ − 1)x∗∗ .
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Figure 4: The numbers of firms in open-loop, closed-loop and s
Therefore,
∂xi(t)
∂n(t)
= −
(n∗∗ − 1)(a − x∗∗ − (n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c)b − (n∗∗ − 2)(a − 2x∗∗ − (n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c)b
2(n∗∗ − 1)
= −
[a + (n∗∗ − 3)x∗∗ − (n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c]b
2(n∗∗ − 1)
,
(26) is reduced to
(a − 2x∗∗ − (n∗∗ − 1)bx∗∗ − c) (29)
−
sb(x∗∗)2 − s(a − n∗∗bx∗∗ − c)
[a+(n∗∗−3)x∗∗−(n∗∗−1)bx∗∗−c]b
2
ρ + n∗∗bs(x∗∗)2
(a − 2n∗∗x∗∗ − c) = 0.
On the other hand, the free entry condition at the steady state is the same as that in the open-loop
case as follows,
(a − n∗∗ − x∗∗)x∗∗ − c(x∗∗) − f = 0. (30)
Solving (29) and (30) we get the steady state values of x∗∗ and n∗∗. We give graphical
representations in Figure 3 assuming a = 11, f = 4, c = 1, s = 1
10
, b = 4
5
and in Figure 4
assuming a = 11, f = 4, c = 1, ρ = 1
2
, b = 4
5
. In these figures we depict the relations between
the number of firms at the steady states of open-loop and closed-loop solutions and the value
of s or ρ.
6 Concluding Remark
In this paper we analyze a dynamic free entry oligopoly with differentiated goods, that is, a
monopolistic competition by differential game approach.
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